The Democratic Republic of Congo, Kuwait, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Thailand all held parliamentary elections between 2022-2024. Individuals seeking elective office in these contexts require resources to meet “pre-election” expectations, run effective campaigns and, if successful, to maintain their political relevance when in office. But how much does all this cost? Where do aspirants find the resources required? And to what extent do these costs increasingly shape who can effectively compete to be a sitting legislator? 

As part of the ongoing EU-funded Women and Youth Democracy Initiative (WYDE) Civic Engagement project, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) has worked with experts to produce a series of qualitative studies on the cost of parliamentary politics in these six countries. Focusing especially on the experiences of women and youth, the studies have interrogated the impacts that these costs can, and do, have on wider democratic practice and processes.  

Here are five key things we have learned so far. 

Whether it be prior to formal campaigning, during the official campaign period, or when elected, costs are a constant feature of politics. The groundwork for the next campaign – for both successful and unsuccessful candidates – starts almost immediately after the conclusion of the previous election period.  

Those who do not win and intend to contest again must double down on their community contributions – this includes building local infrastructure, paying constituents’ education or medical fees, and supporting local festivities (such as in Thailand) – to remain serious contenders for future elections.  

Meanwhile, those who win are expected to take care of projects in their constituencies as well as constituents personal requests. The failure to provide timely and effective support is detrimental to their future election chances.  

Money is one aspect that excludes certain groups from politics with women and youth often the most disadvantaged because they have less access to resources than older men. Financial disadvantage is often compounded, in contexts like rural Liberia and across Kuwait, by cultural and traditional norms that prevent women from being considered for leadership positions. Women interviewed in all six countries also indicated that they experienced various forms of sexual violence and harassment when they chose to enter politics. Faced with these threats, some women choose not to run at all. “I did not have enough money, and my party chair insisted that I sleep with him before getting the party’s nomination. All these issues traumatised me, so I had to quit the race” explained one female aspirant from Liberia.  

Gender quotas have boosted the numbers of female representatives in Senegal and Sierra Leone, but they have not eradicated these barriers to entry for women. 

Vote buying, though in some contexts illegal, remains an integral part of election campaigning. Money is more important than ideology or the social projects that candidates propose. Most incumbents are only held to account when they fail to deliver community projects or take care of constituents’ personal demands, as opposed to failing to effectively oversee government or represent their constituents, or for their voting decisions. In Democratic Republic of Congo, aspirants bemoaned the fact that "people see politics as a commodity” and contended that “for the voters, the elections are the time when they get money out of candidates”. But for voters, this may be the only chance they have to engage with representatives who rarely return to engage in community level consultations when in office.  

Apart from in the Senegalese context, where stronger parties and coalitions provided significant resources to their candidates, aspirants are largely expected to fund their own campaigns with limited or no support from the political party they represent. In fact, a key consideration parties make during the candidate selection process is about the financial capacity of prospective candidates, with many relying heavily on personal networks and their own savings.  

Aspirants can also influence party decisions, and in many cases are expected to, by providing gifts to influential party executives to ensure their selection or, in proportional representation systems, a nomination higher up the list. In Sierra Leone, “aspirants who cannot afford to give money to their party officials during this process face the prospect of being left behind or sidelined”.  

Yet parties still expect successful candidates to contribute to their coffers. This amounts to as much as 10% of official salaries in some contexts.   

With the high costs of seeking and maintaining political office – our indicative data suggests pre-campaign and campaign expenditure exceeds a legislators annual salary - and frequent turnover of elected representatives during elections, those in positions of authority have an increased incentive to extract what they can to recoup the investment made – or in order to fund future election bids – as quickly as possible.  

Pressure can also be exerted on legislators to act in this way by financial backers looking for a return on their investment. With no or loosely enforced obligations to reveal the sources of candidates or parties funding, political actors can become responsive more to the demands of the highest bidders than focused on pushing forward people-centred, and led, development.