Understanding election commissions as interdependent institutions
Commentary
Understanding election commissions as interdependent institutions
We should move beyond the concept of independence and think about election commissions as inherently interdependent institutions that operate in complex political environments, characterised by competing interests and unequal power relations.
In the ongoing struggle between authoritarianism and democracy, institutions continue to matter. This is particularly true for electoral management bodies (EMBs). As the key institutions responsible for the organisation of polls, they are at the forefront of this struggle.
EMBs can safeguard democracy by ensuring the integrity of electoral processes or they can subvert it by undermining people’s trust in the legitimacy of polls – as in the February 2024 election in Pakistan.
The Election Commission of Pakistan’s organisation of the February poll was surrounded by controversies, including delaying the election beyond constitutional deadlines; barring Imran Khan’s political party from using its party symbol – a cricket bat – in the polls; overseeing an unfair electoral campaign marked with high levels of political repression as well as internet and phone services shutdowns; and dragging its feet with the announcement of election results. The outcome was a wide-spread popular distrust in the integrity of electoral processes, increased pre-election violence, and allegations of electoral rigging that undermined the legitimacy of the election.
The fact that a single institution headed by five men can play such an important role in the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy highlights that our collective attention should not only focus on who wins and who loses at the polls, but also at the institutions – and the people – that make elections happen.
The rise of formally independent election commissions
For the past thirty years, many have assumed that electoral management bodies that sit within regular government-controlled bureaucratic structures are prone to manipulation by ruling parties and incumbents, resulting in low-quality elections that risk undermining democracy and its promotion. Releasing them from these government structures was seen as an important way to mitigate such risks. This has led to a proliferation of independent election commissions that now manage elections in more than 64 per cent of countries.
Rooted in liberal assumptions about the virtue of separating powers, the key feature of this model is formal (or de jure) independence, which creates space between those who hold power and electoral management. A set-up like this can be beneficial for democratic processes. A similar formal independence model has been used successfully across a range of institutions in established democracies, including central banks and constitutional courts.
How independent are electoral commissions really?
Formal independence should not be confused with informal (or de facto) independence. Informal independence refers to the extent to which the laws and rules that constitute formal independence are followed in practice. Formal and informal independence often do not go hand-in-hand. Many independent election commissions are independent in name only. This raises important questions about their viability, especially outside established democracies.
There are at least three important considerations.
Independence is a spectrum
First, independence is often presented as something electoral commissions either have or do not have. In reality, independence is more like a spectrum with multiple dimensions. These can include institutional design, decision-making powers, commissioner selection procedures, functional authority, budget, and staff management. Election commissions can be more independent in some of these dimensions than others, but their overall independence should not be seen as a simple sum. Some dimensions matter more than others, depending on the specific context but also on whether they feed into the formal or informal independence.
Independence can present an accountability challenge
Second, formal independence is often seen as a normative good and because of this, the possible challenges it might pose to other key democratic processes, such as accountability, are rarely discussed. When election commissions are formally independent, they are no longer subject to established accountability mechanisms associated with the government, but they still need to be accountable to someone. In some countries, such as Thailand, they are accountable to judges and other formally independent institutions, but this can be just as problematic as being accountable to the government and elected politicians. The goal of formal independence should not be a complete insulation of election commissions from politics and political accountability. It should be a balancing act between accountability, independence, and public interest.
Independence creates unrealistic expectations
Third, even though independent election commissions are established as standalone institutions that are not under direct political control, their ability to function and organise elections depends on the goodwill of many political actors. These can range from presidents, prime ministers, ministers and politicians through to bureaucrats, civil servants, and members of the security forces. All independent election commissions depend on the former for either all or some of their operational and election-related funding. While they can often manage this funding freely once allocated, its availability is not always a given. For example, independent election commissions in Kenya and South Africa have grappled with insufficient budget allocations or outright cuts during several electoral cycles. This creates an important dependency which governments and political actors might exploit to undermine commissions’ ability to organise quality elections.
Independent EMBs cannot do it alone
The cooperation of bureaucrats, civil servants, and members of the security forces is also crucial. As the largest peace-time logistical operations, elections require a mobilisation of significant resources, including staff. Most independent election commissions only have a small body of permanent staff who do not have the capacity to organise elections alone. Instead, they often need to rely on existing government structures and agencies to make elections happen. For example, polling station staff might comprise mostly of government-controlled bureaucrats and civil servants while police officers and soldiers might need to be present to ensure the security of voting before, during, and after the election. In the event of overseas voting, organisation might need to be outsourced to government-controlled embassy staff.
From independence to interdependence
We should move beyond the concept of independence and think about election commissions as inherently interdependent institutions that operate in complex political environments, characterised by competing interests and unequal power relations. Focusing on how election commissions can navigate these environments successfully whilst maintaining a level of trustworthiness with a wide range of stakeholders represents a much more realistic approach. This will require paying closer attention to commissions’ true raisons d'etre – for example, were they established to protect democracy or those in power? Their accountability, capacity (both personal and institutional), transparency, working culture and integrity, and relative power vis-à-vis other electoral stakeholders – such as civil society organisations, media and wider public – are also important considerations.
What would this look like in practice?
The example of Thailand’s election commission
The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was established as a formally independent electoral management body in the late 1990s. By focusing on its interdependence as opposed to its independence, we can begin to appreciate that the ECT was established to protect the power and interests of the country’s unelected conservative elite rather than elected politicians and citizens, and that it was designed to reflect that. As such, the ECT enjoys high levels of formal independence. It also wields significant powers over politicians, political parties, and other electoral stakeholders but has no direct accountability to them or the wider public. It can disqualify political candidates from running for office, propose entire political parties for dissolution, and refuse to issue permits or release funding for domestic election monitors.
Understanding the ECT through the lens of independence alone does not capture many of these complexities and can lead to the misdiagnosis of Thailand’s political problems. By focusing on its interdependence as opposed to its independence, we can begin to appreciate that addressing these problems may not require ‘more’ independence because in the Thai context independence has become a tool to insulate the ECT from citizens and their elected representatives. Instead, we might need to consider how we can balance its power-relations and make it more accountable to public interest.
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Understanding election commissions as interdependent institutions
Understanding election commissions as interdependent institutions
Dr Petra Alderman
In the ongoing struggle between authoritarianism and democracy, institutions continue to matter. This is particularly true for electoral management bodies (EMBs). As the key institutions responsible for the organisation of polls, they are at the forefront of this struggle.
EMBs can safeguard democracy by ensuring the integrity of electoral processes or they can subvert it by undermining people’s trust in the legitimacy of polls – as in the February 2024 election in Pakistan.
The Election Commission of Pakistan’s organisation of the February poll was surrounded by controversies, including delaying the election beyond constitutional deadlines; barring Imran Khan’s political party from using its party symbol – a cricket bat – in the polls; overseeing an unfair electoral campaign marked with high levels of political repression as well as internet and phone services shutdowns; and dragging its feet with the announcement of election results. The outcome was a wide-spread popular distrust in the integrity of electoral processes, increased pre-election violence, and allegations of electoral rigging that undermined the legitimacy of the election.
The fact that a single institution headed by five men can play such an important role in the struggle between authoritarianism and democracy highlights that our collective attention should not only focus on who wins and who loses at the polls, but also at the institutions – and the people – that make elections happen.
The rise of formally independent election commissions
For the past thirty years, many have assumed that electoral management bodies that sit within regular government-controlled bureaucratic structures are prone to manipulation by ruling parties and incumbents, resulting in low-quality elections that risk undermining democracy and its promotion. Releasing them from these government structures was seen as an important way to mitigate such risks. This has led to a proliferation of independent election commissions that now manage elections in more than 64 per cent of countries.
Rooted in liberal assumptions about the virtue of separating powers, the key feature of this model is formal (or de jure) independence, which creates space between those who hold power and electoral management. A set-up like this can be beneficial for democratic processes. A similar formal independence model has been used successfully across a range of institutions in established democracies, including central banks and constitutional courts.
How independent are electoral commissions really?
Formal independence should not be confused with informal (or de facto) independence. Informal independence refers to the extent to which the laws and rules that constitute formal independence are followed in practice. Formal and informal independence often do not go hand-in-hand. Many independent election commissions are independent in name only. This raises important questions about their viability, especially outside established democracies.
There are at least three important considerations.
Independence is a spectrum
First, independence is often presented as something electoral commissions either have or do not have. In reality, independence is more like a spectrum with multiple dimensions. These can include institutional design, decision-making powers, commissioner selection procedures, functional authority, budget, and staff management. Election commissions can be more independent in some of these dimensions than others, but their overall independence should not be seen as a simple sum. Some dimensions matter more than others, depending on the specific context but also on whether they feed into the formal or informal independence.
Independence can present an accountability challenge
Second, formal independence is often seen as a normative good and because of this, the possible challenges it might pose to other key democratic processes, such as accountability, are rarely discussed. When election commissions are formally independent, they are no longer subject to established accountability mechanisms associated with the government, but they still need to be accountable to someone. In some countries, such as Thailand, they are accountable to judges and other formally independent institutions, but this can be just as problematic as being accountable to the government and elected politicians. The goal of formal independence should not be a complete insulation of election commissions from politics and political accountability. It should be a balancing act between accountability, independence, and public interest.
Independence creates unrealistic expectations
Third, even though independent election commissions are established as standalone institutions that are not under direct political control, their ability to function and organise elections depends on the goodwill of many political actors. These can range from presidents, prime ministers, ministers and politicians through to bureaucrats, civil servants, and members of the security forces. All independent election commissions depend on the former for either all or some of their operational and election-related funding. While they can often manage this funding freely once allocated, its availability is not always a given. For example, independent election commissions in Kenya and South Africa have grappled with insufficient budget allocations or outright cuts during several electoral cycles. This creates an important dependency which governments and political actors might exploit to undermine commissions’ ability to organise quality elections.
Independent EMBs cannot do it alone
The cooperation of bureaucrats, civil servants, and members of the security forces is also crucial. As the largest peace-time logistical operations, elections require a mobilisation of significant resources, including staff. Most independent election commissions only have a small body of permanent staff who do not have the capacity to organise elections alone. Instead, they often need to rely on existing government structures and agencies to make elections happen. For example, polling station staff might comprise mostly of government-controlled bureaucrats and civil servants while police officers and soldiers might need to be present to ensure the security of voting before, during, and after the election. In the event of overseas voting, organisation might need to be outsourced to government-controlled embassy staff.
From independence to interdependence
We should move beyond the concept of independence and think about election commissions as inherently interdependent institutions that operate in complex political environments, characterised by competing interests and unequal power relations. Focusing on how election commissions can navigate these environments successfully whilst maintaining a level of trustworthiness with a wide range of stakeholders represents a much more realistic approach. This will require paying closer attention to commissions’ true raisons d'etre – for example, were they established to protect democracy or those in power? Their accountability, capacity (both personal and institutional), transparency, working culture and integrity, and relative power vis-à-vis other electoral stakeholders – such as civil society organisations, media and wider public – are also important considerations.
What would this look like in practice?
The example of Thailand’s election commission
The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was established as a formally independent electoral management body in the late 1990s. By focusing on its interdependence as opposed to its independence, we can begin to appreciate that the ECT was established to protect the power and interests of the country’s unelected conservative elite rather than elected politicians and citizens, and that it was designed to reflect that. As such, the ECT enjoys high levels of formal independence. It also wields significant powers over politicians, political parties, and other electoral stakeholders but has no direct accountability to them or the wider public. It can disqualify political candidates from running for office, propose entire political parties for dissolution, and refuse to issue permits or release funding for domestic election monitors.
Understanding the ECT through the lens of independence alone does not capture many of these complexities and can lead to the misdiagnosis of Thailand’s political problems. By focusing on its interdependence as opposed to its independence, we can begin to appreciate that addressing these problems may not require ‘more’ independence because in the Thai context independence has become a tool to insulate the ECT from citizens and their elected representatives. Instead, we might need to consider how we can balance its power-relations and make it more accountable to public interest.
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